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Introduction 
Africa. Who are you?  
I deliberately don’t say here, “What are you?” As we know, the 
interrogative pronoun “what” is an attempt to grab the essence of 
something. As Heidegger says: “whatness [Wassein], comprises what one 
commonly calls… the idea or mental representation by means of which we 
propose to… grasp what a thing is.”1 As such, questions starting with the 
interrogative pronoun “what” are eminently violent because they reduce the 
object of inquiry to a thing that can be held in one’s hand; that can make 
sense as a totality; that can be conceptualized with one idea. The history of 
philosophy— from Plato2 to Augustine,3 from Descartes4 to Lenin,5 all the 
way to Kwame Nkrumah,6 for example—is littered with the question 
“What…?”; with these violent attempts at grabbing the essence of 
something.7 Africa’s history is also littered with these attempts at reducing a 
continent to an essence or concept. These attempts are absurdly grandiose 
(pinning down “the idea” of Africa, for example8) and ridiculously small 
(analyzing the minutiae of life in a village, for example9). In all cases, they 
try to envision Africa as an object to be possessed by any means and I know 
that we can’t carry on doing that.  
So I repeat once more, Africa, who are you10? I realize that using the 
interrogative pronoun “who” for what is usually understood as a 
geographical landmass is rather odd. One does not ask a continent who they 
are. The reason I am asking “who” rather than “what” is because I want to 
evade a more specific problem. The problem is that the question “What?” 
usually hides a very conventional understanding of time, the singular time 
of the author. This problem is not unique to African Studies; it permeates 
most fields in the humanities and social sciences. However, I think it is most 
salient in the field of African Studies because Africa has so often been the 
object of anthropological and ethnological investigations, and that, as 
Johannes Fabian’s famous book Time and the Other has taught us, these 
2 6  |  B e t w e e n  E a r t h  a n d  S k y  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 1 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.756 
investigations always posit two times: the time of the ethnographer and the 
time of the object investigated, namely, here, Africa.11 In what follows, my 
aim is not to repeat Fabian’s well-known argument, but to excavate this 
much more constitutive problem of the time of the ethnographer or of any 
other “grapher” (a philosopher, for example) who speaks or writes about 
Africa or African philosophy.  
You could no doubt ask: does it matter? Why should we explore the 
time of the author asking the question “What?” Isn’t what counts what the 
author says and not his or her apperception of time? This is why evading the 
interrogative pronoun “What?” is crucial. My argument is that asking the 
question “What?” (objectively12 or subjectively13) necessarily always posits 
the time of the author as abstract, intuited, and hidden. This hidden time is, 
of course, that of thought. It is not the present or a stand in for presence 
because thought exceeds the confines of the “here and now,” dragging in the 
past (the reason for the question) and the future (the anticipation of an 
answer). It is a much more complex time that stretches out in all directions 
with the author’s “I think” at its core. He or she is indeed always there, 
alone, in the fullness of this abstract and intuited time without needing 
justification to be able to ask: “What is there?”/”What am I?” The question 
“What?” not only objectifies and essentializes what is put under scrutiny, it 
also consolidates the thinking author in its hidden temporal confines. Why is 
this always the case? Why do scholarly writing so often hide under an 
abstract and intuited time and can there be another way of going about it? 
You could also ask: but isn’t my question “Who are you, Africa?” not 
also positing an abstract apperception of time? The answer is “no” because 
the interrogative pronoun “Who?”—unlike “What?”—necessarily calls for 
dialogue and therefore for at least two times: the other’s and mine. “Who?” 
concerns not the fixing of the representation of a thing, but the possibility of 
an interlocutor who could potentially respond. As such, the question 
“Who?” is effectively a theological and not a philosophical question. It is 
addressed not only to the other, but also potentially to the radically Other (in 
most cases, God).14 The theological aspect of the question “Who?” is not 
intended to entirely discard the question “What?” or to call for a return to 
religious talk. The shift from philosophy to theology is an attempt, on the 
one hand, to insist on the importance of treating Africa as a subject and not 
as an object and on the other, to posit the possibility of another time, and 
therefore of another kind of conversation.  
By evading the question “What?” and insisting on the theological 
question “Who?” instead, my aim is to question what I call the mono-logic 
that always structures all thoughts in the humanities and in what concerns 
us here African Studies. As its name implies, a mono-logic refers to a 
singular logic.15 This logic is the one that equates time in general with an “I 
think” asking the question “What?” In other words, a mono-logic equates 
time with the cogito and therefore with logos.16 This equation is as old as 
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philosophy:17 it can be found, for example, in Aristotle who famously says 
that, “it is impossible for there to be time if there is no mind…”18 clearly 
emphasizing the equivalence of the two. Hegel also insists that “time is the 
same principle as the I = I of pure self-consciousness,”19 thus leaving time 
with no room to being anything else. Even the early Heidegger asserts 
authoritatively that: “time and the ‘I think’ are no longer opposed to one 
another as unlike and incompatible; they are the same.”20 These random 
examples do no mean that no philosopher ever attempted to debunk the 
hegemony of this stringent mono-logic. Emmanuel Levinas’ attempt, for 
example, to re-inscribe the radically Other in the cogito’s “I am”21 only 
displaces the problem without resolving it. The “fearful face‐ to-face that 
takes place without mediation”22 that Levinas speaks off, clearly shatters the 
sealed aspect of the cogito, finally giving us a glimpse of a time (“hers”23) 
that, at last, isn’t “his.” However, while it gives the radically Other the 
possibility of playing its part in the constitution of time, it still rests on an 
inter-subjective relation with the cogito playing a crucial part: the perfect 
equal of time.24  
By focusing on the unflinching equation time = cogito, my aim is neither 
to resurrect the cogito, like Slavoj Žižek25 nor to confirm its universality. I 
realize, for example, that there might not be such a thing as a cogito in Africa 
because many African languages evade the subject-verb-object structure of 
Germanic and Latin languages, including English.26 While this is true, it 
does not necessarily follow that the temporality of a self-positing subject 
asking the question of philosophy—however it is grammatically 
constructed—does not remain an abstract, intuited and hidden time. This 
does not universalize the cogito. This simply emphasizes the universality of 
this abstract, intuited, and hidden time as the most common understanding 
of time for a subject positing itself in language and asking: “What?” It is as if 
the entire history of thought has been authorized by the extraordinary right 
of the equation: abstract, intuited, and hidden time = cogito. The question is 
therefore this: how is one to conceive an approach to time that is not entirely 
dictated by this mono-logic, this equation that monopolizes all scholarly 
endeavors? 
The reason I think it is important to raise this question in the context of 
this conference/publication is because, for me, a mono-logical thought is, as 
Grant Farred asked us to reflect upon, the limit at which all thought on 
Africa begins and ends. Farred’s question for this conference was indeed 
“Why not think/propose the limit? Why not make the limit a constitutive 
element when thinking Africa and African philosophy? What thinking 
might thinking the limit provoke, make possible, compel even?”27 My 
attempt, in what follows, is to say, firstly, that all thinking of the limit is 
necessarily mono-logical because in order to constitute or erase a limit, it is 
necessary to equate the “I think” who envisages this limit with an intuited 
abstract time detached from this very limit. And secondly, to ask in return: if 
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this equation is true, then is it at all possible to think a type of limit that isn’t 
mono-logical? This is not an attempt to dismiss Farred’s formidable 
question. On the contrary, this is an attempt to be as faithful as possible to 
the question and say: without a new thinking of the time from which one 
asks questions, no new mode of thinking on the limits of Africa or its 
philosophy is possible and this new thinking starts from the premise of the 
question: Africa, who are you? A question that, unlike “What?”, invites, as I 
will try to show, a radically new relationship to time. 
A word of warning before I begin: this is only a personal philosophical 
reflection. I am neither an Africanist nor a specialist in African philosophy or 
history. My knowledge of Africa is limited to the great lake region and 
specific African thinkers more or less within a Francophone remit. As such, 
my specialization is quite narrow. In this way, what follows restricts itself to 
a number of traditions taken from a small part of the continent and not from 
its many and diverse diasporas. Furthermore, although this essay starts with 
a wildly ambitious and generic first question about Africa, it does not 
pretend to situate itself within the context of African philosophy or to speak 
on behalf of African philosophers. This essay is effectively written as the 
continuation of a thought on time I began over fifteen years ago with my 
first book on the idea of the future outside of all predictions, and that I 
continued with two further publications, the one on Rwanda and the one on 
the spatial and temporal dimension of masculinity, The End of Man.28 This 
reflection has reached a new stage, one which, as I hope I will demonstrate, 
prevents the possibility of thinking time from a mono-logical perspective. 
This personal stage coincides with another text, which should ideally be 
read in parallel with this paper, called “Time Unshackled” for the journal 
New Formations (forthcoming, 2016). 
 
Poly-Logics  
There is perhaps one way of conceiving an approach to time that is not 
entirely dictated by a mono-logic and therefore by the equation cogito = time. 
This approach is discretely put forward by two totally unrelated African 
philosophers: the late Rwandan Octave Ugirashebuja29 and the Ivorian 
Bourahima Ouattara. I will only focus on the latter for two reasons: firstly, 
for lack of space and secondly because Ouattara’s argument situates itself in 
a much larger reflection on the conditions of possibility for thought at the 
pale of philosophy. There is unfortunately no space here for me to present 
Bourahima Ouattara, let alone do justice to his remarkable work.30 I have 
dedicated an essay to his work in a special issue edited by Pierre-Philippe 
Fraiture for the International Journal of Francophone Studies and I cannot 
therefore replicate here the arguments put forward in it.31 I will, however, 
highlight the following crucial aspects of his work in what concerns me here: 
the overcoming of the equation time = cogito and mono-logical thinking.  
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Bourahima Ouattara is a prolific philosopher who has already written 
seven books of philosophy, a novel, and a number of essays in the field of 
literary criticism.32 In what concerns me here, one of the most striking 
aspects of his work is that he always writes at the juncture between 
philosophy and ethnography. This juncture does not concern itself with 
disciplines or rigid institutional discourses. His aim is to devise a type of 
thought that is both truthful to his being and, if possible, free of concepts. To 
devise this type of thought, he comes up with what he calls an ethno-
thought, which should obviously not be confused with an 
ethnophilosophy.33 Contrary to an ethnophilosophy which necessarily takes 
the premise of Western and therefore Greek philosophy for granted, an 
ethno-thought starts from the premise of the death of philosophy and from 
the birth of one’s own ethnos, which does not refer to one’s own family, tribe, 
nation, or racial affiliation, but to the way, one apprehends oneself in time-
space. In this way, Ouattara writes not at the intersection of rigid disciplines, 
but at a crossroad of practices, right where and when language articulates 
his world and allows him to depart from it.34  
In an essay on the ethnological aspects of African ontology published in 
2000 for the Cahiers d’études africaines, Ouattara confirms John Mbiti’s view35 
that African thought largely evades metric or measured representations of 
time.36 However, unlike Mbiti, his aim is not to support old or dubious 
ethnographic findings or to excavate some imaginary pre-colonial 
interpretation of being in relation to time. His aim is to devise a type of 
thought that would be representative of Africa in as much as its temporal 
structures evade all forms of measurements and therefore, as I will try to 
show, the equation cogito = time. He writes in a seemingly cryptic, but in fact 
formidable passage:  
At the intersection of philosophy and ethnology, it is necessary not 
only to disarticulate chronological time, but also to de-center space 
in order to reveal its originary ontological coordination. This 
coordination shows that space is always the place of a dwelling that 
allows gods to visit mortals. This dwelling does not allow for any 
form of scientific archeo-logy that would be made with 
instrumental or utilitarian aims in sight. It calls instead for an 
ontological letting-be of four elements (gods/sky/earth/mortals). 
This does not put forward the kind of atomism that can be found in 
mechanical materialist thought. This work of disarticulation, on the 
contrary, invigorates and deepens the aims of an ethnology based 
on a post-philosophical thought.37 
What is one to make of this statement? There is no doubt that Ouattara is 
largely influenced by the thought of Heidegger from after the turning (die 
Kehre).38 References to concepts such as “dwelling,” “letting-be,” and 
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“gods/sky/earth/mortals” will sound familiar to most Heideggerian 
scholars.39 However, these references should be understood within the 
context of his views on Africa. In a book called Penser l’Afrique suivi de 
l’Afrique “Fragmentée” Ouattara puts forward the idea of thinking Africa in 
its facticity, that is, in the way it creates and produces itself aside from all 
forms of conceptualization (colonial or post-colonial).40 For that, he needs to 
think what it means to expose a fact of existence without automatically 
staining “it” with concepts: subjectivities, identities, histories, geographies, 
political, social, ethnic, or cultural contexts, etc.41 This attempt to think at the 
edge of concepts does not mean that he blatantly ignores what makes Africa 
what it “is” or what constitutes the ontical realities of African’s daily lives. 
His work of fiction clearly attests to that.42 His aim is on the contrary to 
think what structures the facticity that underlines his own ethnos: temporarily 
being a Heideggerian Ivorian philosopher living in Basel—with all the 
contradictions that this entails.  
With this aim, Ouattara has no other choice, but to perceive himself at 
once within a post-philosophical order and therefore in a sphere where the 
question “what?” no longer has a strong hold. As such, his apperception of 
time-space43 necessarily takes place at the cusp of theology (“Who?”) 
without entrenching this theology, as I will show, in any religiosity or 
spirituality. At this cusp, Ouattara articulates time-space, following 
Heidegger, as dwelling.44 Dwelling does not mean living in a house or in a 
region of earth and surrounding ourselves with familiar objects and call it 
home. Dwelling means initiating one’s own nature, our being capable of 
death as death. In other words, dwelling means setting ourselves into our 
own presencing and, in the process, originate time-space. Now it would be 
wrong to imagine this dwelling as yet another hidden mono-logical point: 
the “dwelling fact” of existence structuring us behind the cumbersomeness 
of our lives, for example. Ouattara writes from the premise of the death of 
philosophy and therefore from the demise of all forms of ontologies, 
including the device known as Dasein. Hence the unusual reference to gods 
visiting mortals and the fourfold.  
The reason Ouattara mentions the fourfold (with its gods) in passing is 
because in a post-philosophical context, dwelling cannot be the only 
dimension that structures time-space. Dwelling is only one dimension 
amongst four. Mortals dwell, but this undeniable fact is not the only thing 
that constitutes time-space. Alongside mortals setting themselves into their 
own presence, sky, earth, and gods also inhabit and create time-space. 
Together they form the fourfold. Together they create time-space. The a-
conceptuality of time-space thus become much more difficult to describe 
because it is no longer a mono-logical affair structured by a lonesome 
hypostasis at its core: the cogito. It involves other dimensions that come to 
disturb this mono-logic. This is not an easy thought because with the 
fourfold, it is necessary to think time-space as the combination of more than 
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two dimensions crisscrossing each other without a singular perspective (the 
“I think”/“I am”) looking back and forth, ahead and behind. 
Consequently, this fourfold should not be understood as a set of 
cardinal points or anything that could stand for a spatial or geographical 
metaphor. Let’s take the first two in Ouattara’s reference by going back to 
Heidegger words: “The Earth is the serving bearer… The sky is the vaulting 
path of the sun.”45 The earth is not the soil on planet earth, but that from 
which mortals dwell. In this way, the earth does not stand for the continent 
called “Africa” or “Europe,” for example. The earth stands for the serving 
bearer that gives us the “idea of Africa.” This serving bearer can be anything 
associated with that name: from a clay object to an economic statistic, 
basically, anything from which to cultivate ideas or concepts while mortals set 
themselves into presencing. By contrast, the sky stands for everything into 
which mortals dwell. This refers neither the atmosphere nor the outer space 
seen from earth, but the space mortals give to what they have taken from 
earth. The sky stands for what mortals make of the earth, what they project 
themselves into, what they cast light onto, what they illuminate with 
meaning.46 The sky is therefore the space into which “the idea of Africa” 
acquires meaning, whether laboring the earth or writing about it. Overall, it 
is under the sky and on earth that mortals dwell, that is, it is there, in 
between the two,47 that they initiate their own nature—their being capable of 
death as death.  
Inevitably, the big question is why on earth and under the sky should 
there be gods visiting mortals? Why gods and not God? This is the trickiest 
of references because it is so loaded with spiritual, mystical, religious and 
metaphysical connotations. Gods in both Ouattara and Heidegger’s minds 
have nothing to do with any religious expression or representation, not even 
those who deny all forms of representations as in Islam.48 The word “gods” 
in the plural does not refer to a deity in the conventional sense of the term. 
As one dimension of the fourfold, the gods stand for the manifold49 
emergence of what is unexpected or unusual in mortals’ living present.50 As 
futurities, the gods alter mortals’ access to presence, by bringing in what is 
new and as such can never be described as something “pre-given.”51 As 
Reiner Schürmann rightly says, they designate “the sudden irruption in 
which a constellation of presence and absence situates everything anew.”52 
In this way, they do not stand for the infinite, the radically other, the 
almighty, the creator, the star-maker, the holy ghost or any other entity, not 
even Spirit, this intertwinement of human and divine agency as in Hegel. 
Nothing can characterize them because through their disruptions, they come 
with the Word, as the fourfold emerges and this, without any promises of 
redemption or salvation and without any eschatological or messianic signs.  
In this way, there can be nothing tralatitious about these gods simply 
because they can never perdure over time and in doing so create religions or 
spiritual movements. There is no “moment” when suddenly the Word 
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appears, God speaks, and then “another moment” when His Word needs to 
be repeated because with the gods, there is no distinction between the 
Verb,53 its advent, or its repetition. In other words, there isn’t first the Word 
and then the possibility of semantic conflict, wars and genocides. There is the 
happenstance of the fourfold which is nothing other than the event of the 
Word and therefore of war, right when it takes place and right when peace is 
concluded.54 In this way, the gods have no moral compass, and they come 
with no Torah, Bible, or Koran. They work only to disrupt unexpectedly the 
fourfold and mortals need to deal with these disruptions, not on their own, 
but as part of the fourfold, alongside earth and sky.55 The gods—another 
difficult thought—effectively manifest themselves in the dependency of the 
fourfold, that is, in the dependency of mortals, sky and earth. There would 
be no gods without the fourfold, that is, without the emergence of the Word, 
any event whatsoever.56 This mutual independency within the fourfold is 
crucial: we get the surprises that the fourfold deserves, including tsunamis 
and wars.57 
With this passing reference, Ouattara points at the possibility of finally 
getting ourselves out of the strict equation time = cogito that has plagued 
philosophy since immemorial times. With the fourfold, we leave behind the 
narrow confines of our relationship with time-space and accede to a fourfold 
spatio-temporal order in which neither “I think” nor “I am” is central. 
Downgraded (and not discarded, as in Quentin Meillassoux, for example58) 
from its imperious position, the cogito suddenly needs to accommodate itself 
with the “whereunto” and the “why” of the other folds: earth, sky, and gods. 
The gods are neither the cause nor the end of mortals’ happenstance, and yet 
they cannot take place without them. Inversely, we, as mortals, are neither 
the creators nor the inventors of gods and yet we cannot dwell without 
them. Earth and sky render vain all our attempts at elevation and yet we 
would not elevate ourselves without them. The poly-logic inherent in the 
fourfold dislocates, as Ouattara says, our long-held ontical interpretations of 
time-space, forcing us to accept that the mono-logic under which we operate 
is nothing but one of four that arises non-simultaneously, the uniqueness of 
the event of being, the factuality of history in which man plays, but only a 
small part.59 By quadrupling the poles of reference, Ouattara, in the wake of 
Heidegger, ends up debunking all foundations and principles and the entire 
arsenal of archic and telic spatial and temporal representations. With this 
discrete hint of the fourfold in a text on African ethnologies, Ouattara 
basically manages to remove time-space from our commonplace mono-logic 
epochal stamping and hands it over to a poly-logic situation in which the 
cogito is, at last, no longer the sole player. 
Now it would be wrong to imagine Ouattara’s interpretation of time-
space as if following some twisted or perverted logic: applying hyper-
abstract ideas borrowed from an elderly ex-Nazi-sympathizer onto his own 
being and by extension, African thought. In a way, one could argue that 
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nothing could be further from anything relating to Africa. But Ouattara’s 
aim is neither to pitch one institution against another (Greek/African 
philosophy) nor to invent some tenuous link between the ethnographies and 
philosophies of the Ivory Coast and those of Germany. His aim is to think 
“the philosophical-ethnological status of thought,”60 that is, a type of 
thought that is finally unencumbered by the gravitational forces of mono-
logy, forces that always bring everything down to the subject understood as 
object stuck in a single time with a past and a future. This is a difficult 
thought because it does not allow one to dwell on any folkloric aspect of our 
own ethnos, i.e. the idiosyncrasies of the places and/or times from which we 
hail. The aim is to think the happenstance of our Be-ing at its place of 
dwelling, that is, as it enters into presencing, as it deals with the fourfold 
with its unruly, but dependent gods. 
To make such a bold claim is not to suggest that, from now on, we 
should return to polytheism and believe in gods or that we should try to 
reinvent faith in the hope of finding where gods are lurking. Whether 
monotheist or polytheist, to “believe” or “seek out” is to posit the divine or 
divinities as existing independently of mortals. But this is not the case with 
either Ouattara or Heidegger. Gods and mortals are united in their co-
dependency between earth and sky. In this way, if we follow Ouattara’s 
thought, then the aim is therefore two-fold: on the one hand, we can no 
longer think in one time only: the cogito needs to deal with more than just 
the time that structures it; it needs to deal with other dimensions, some of 
which are out of its control or jurisdiction. On the other hand, this thought 
allows us to see that the only way out of the constitutive problem we face 
everyday in our capitalist world—the fact that the present is never present 
enough, a problem that contemporary philosophy is at the moment unable 
to overcome61—can only be resolved by radically multiplying and increasing 
the depths that we give to the future, here named gods.62 The gods are 
futurities, here understood not as a singular horizon of possibility, but as a 
firmament of untimeliness, the very tangible marks of what can never be 
guessed, what can never give us a return in this life. Isn’t this precisely what 
capitalism abhors above all else?  
 
Africa 
So here I am addressing myself to you, Africa.63 The “I” that addresses you 
and signs this essay counts for little.  
Firstly, I do not stand high and mighty outside of the semantic economy 
of language, dictating the view from an imaginary site of eternal presence or 
from a universal “elsewhere” detached from the vagaries and idiosyncrasies 
of my mortal body. I have also avoided using an impersonal and passive 
voice in order to emphasize a supposed impartiality, objectivity, or detached 
subjectivity. My words engage the semantic economy of language from a 
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specific place in time-space and from the peculiarities of an ever-changing 
body that knows it is dying, but this economy is not the only one that makes 
time-space. Another economy, a much more subtle and complex economy—
one that defies all economies as trade or bartering—also structures this 
language that is now, more than ever, never really mine.64 Earth, sky, and 
gods also play their part in this economy. The semantic economy of 
language would not exist without this continually disregarded fourfold 
economy that sunders its associated mono-logical time-space into a plurality 
of time-spaces.  
Secondly, I do not stand as the agency through which time-space take 
place. My finitude isn’t the only thing that can reveal and paradoxically also 
evade the in-finity65 of time-space. No capitalized word, in Greek or in any 
other language, embodies alone such event. Furthermore, my proper name 
does not hypostasize this event—even if conceived on the edge of property 
or properness66—with a date of birth and an indeterminate date of death on 
the horizon, channeling on the way im-memorial pasts and un-foreseeable 
futures. Past and future are made up of other dimensions—earth, sky, 
gods—that exceed my finitude, including the future ephemeral engraving 
on my tombstone. In this way, my finitude is just one dimension of a 
fourfold whose other dimensions exceed me and point in the direction of a 
beyond “me,” a divine “beyond” where I no longer matter, where none of 
this (African studies, philosophy, the world, the earth), no longer matters. 
Once more, here I am addressing myself to you, Africa. The “you” of 
this address arises out of a depth without measure. 
Firstly, this “you” or this “Africa” comes neither from a mysterious 
place of learning nor from direct observation. In other words, you neither 
stems from the hallowed spaces of libraries (SOAS in London, for example) 
nor from the intricacies of lived experienced (my colleagues in the 
University town of Butare in Rwanda, for example). You come from a place 
that paradoxically allows itself to be apprehended and exploited and yet 
exceeds all attempts to harness or master. You, Africa, rise before me from 
an impenetrable in-finity made up of questionable inventions, dubious 
ideas, dangerous parallels and analogies (pre-colonial, colonial, or post-
colonial) and of a depth that defies all understanding of depth. The earth 
from which you hail, this earth that allows you to inspire and agitate us into 
action and writing, can only indeed shatter all scientific knowledge, past, 
present, and future, including the proceedings of this very scholarly 
undertaking. The earth is no substantial ground, but a withdrawal of 
ground.67 If this weren’t the case, Africa would have never been able to rise 
in our consciousness in the way you do here.  
Secondly, this “you” does not stem from a specific continent, not even 
the one that bears your name. While there is no doubt that, as Mudimbe 
says, “there are natural features, cultural characteristics, and, probably, 
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values that contribute to the reality of Africa as a continent and its 
civilization as constituting a totality”68 worth addressing, these features, 
characteristics, and values are not exactly what make you stand here before 
us. This earth, out of which you grew, was made by Grant Farred, Gerard 
Aching and Kasereka Kavwahirehi. No, they are not the fathers of Africa, 
but they are the ones who conjured up the ferment that allowed the 
addressee of this paper to rise up before us, mortals. Their efforts were not 
just practical, organizational, or developmental (stemming from the 
previous conference that took place at Rhodes University, for example). 
Their efforts exceed such simple causalities and effects. The “you” or the 
“Africa” that emerges here in these pages rose because of their mortal 
thinking bodies involved in other earths, skies and gods. Without their own 
fourfolds, without this unfathomable and diverse ferment out of which you 
grew, I could not have addressed you. 
And again, here I am addressing myself to you, Africa. This “you” 
elevates itself beyond this aggregate of living subjectivities that makes Africa 
what it is.  
Firstly, this “you” or this “Africa” does not elevate itself into an 
academic or scholarly setting, the kind of setting—spoken or written—in 
which scholars ponder the meaning of Africa, its limits or ends. This does 
not mean that there is no event called “you” or “African Thinking: And/At 
its Limits.” This simply means that a lot more is at stake when it comes to 
the way this addressee manifests itself as Africa. Firstly, “you” is both 
singular (the second person singular, Africa) and plural (the second person 
plural, the many significations and/or manifestations attached to the word 
Africa). This undecided character necessarily sets this addressee or 
denomination apart, not into an “elsewhere,” but at a limit where the 
semantic unity is unstable: at once singular and multiple. We all have both 
one strict idea of who you are and a multiplicity of conflicting opinions 
about you. As such, when addressed, this “you” or Africa elevates itself into 
a realm on the edge of all discursive formations whether oral or written; a 
realm for which the sky is the limit. And this limit is changeable, always 
prone to inhospitable weather. In this way, the sky into which “you” or 
Africa appears is therefore structured by much more than what we can 
think, do, or say, at conferences, in academic journals, or anywhere else on 
earth; a “much more” without which none of this could take place.  
Secondly, this “you” or this “Africa” does not emerge as a fact or object 
obediently setting itself up to be probed, dissected, analyzed, and discarded. 
The very fact that you happen, that scholars address you, does not mean that 
you raise yourself solely to be placed, submissive and docile, under the 
scrutiny of scientific enquiries. Because you are above all, as previously 
mentioned, a subject or a plurality of subjects, you are effectively limit-less, a 
finite and yet infinite offering. This does not mean you are a gift created, 
produced, or manufactured for study, action, or entertainment. This means 
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instead that, as subject(s), you are an offering that defies all forms of 
biological or logical creation, production, or manufacture. Insubordinate, 
rebellious, the other of the upright concept,69 you are an offering that never 
ceases to frustrate anyone who approaches you. Your defiance knows no 
bounds. The ungraspable expanse of the sky into which you elevate yourself 
therefore also plays its part and mortals need to hear this unruly in-finity if 
they want to do right by you. Without the boundlessness of the sky into 
which you emerge for consideration, I—or anyone else—could not even 
begin to address you.  
And finally, one last time, here I am addressing myself to you, Africa. In 
this sentence, the subject (“I”), the verb (“addressing”) and the addressee 
(“you” or “Africa”) don’t just come together because of an “I think.” 
Firstly, the sentence “I am addressing myself to you, Africa” does not 
just constitute an event between mortals. It is not simply a response to a call 
for papers. If it were, then it would simply be discussed for a while—the 
time of a conference, the time of a peer-reviewed journal—and then 
discarded, the typical mortal destiny of all addresses, whether oral or 
written. To reduce this address to such an inevitable destiny—even if it is 
understood as destinerrance, i.e. an errancy outside the control of the 
addressor70—is to demote it to the status of object: a paper, an essay. To say 
“I am addressing myself to you” is in fact to create an event that also 
involves utterly dependent, but unfathomable gods. Again, mention of these 
gods does not intend to create a new religion, but to give figure to how the 
future manifests itself: in this case, your volatile responses, your 
unpredictable thinking or questioning, i.e. all these monstrous disruptions to 
the event of this address. In this way, it is not only in your hands that I am 
leaving this message; it is also in the hands of these unruly and yet 
dependent gods. Without these gods, without these responses that make 
who you are, this address would not have taken place. 
Secondly, the event “I am addressing myself to you, Africa” is not just 
an ethical response to a problem of limits—the limits of African thought, for 
example. Strictly speaking, this address neither inscribes itself solely within 
a set of normative ethics (polite codes, scholarly etiquette, academic good 
conduct, contractual arrangements, etc.) nor within an understanding of 
ethics that involves the radically Other, a type of responsibility before all 
forms of morality. If this were the case, then this address would inscribe 
itself within the context of a tradable morality: either with society (an 
economic covenant) or with God (a religious or spiritual covenant). Because 
dependent gods are involved, this address sets itself instead in a plurality of 
responses that can never be pinned down with laws, codes, or precepts. The 
earth gives rise to it. The sky allows it to take place. Mortals give it 
significance. Gods disrupt it. This fourfold approach does not free the 
addressor of ethical or moral duties. The fourfold constrains him or her to 
think their ethical responses as one amongst other responses originating in 
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other dimensions, including earth, sky, and gods. These other responses 
might not necessarily be ethical. Other dimensions’ responses might well 
jeopardize all chances of lawfulness and salvation. 
I started this paper with the improper question “Africa, who are you?” 
By asking the question “who” instead of “what” my aim was to question the 
recurrent mono-logic that always informs most scholarly addresses, 
including those put forward in African Studies and, more broadly, 
philosophy in general. Through such questioning, I hope to have shown that 
it is not quite possible to reduce either the “I think” and/or the “I am” to 
time as such. Other dimensions inflect and deflect, distort and reassemble 
this cogito without allowing it to either reconfigure it as the twin of time or 
merge it with time to the point of being utterly undifferentiated. This is what 
Ouattara’s radical destabilization of time-space allowed us to see and put to 
the test. The present paper only hints at the possibilities of not making time 
and the “I think”/“I am” the sole organizing structure. Much more will need 
to be said and written in order to continue debunking this simple myth that 
time and the cogito are either one or unrelated. 
Beyond the present figuration, Africa will obviously not respond. I have 
neither plundered the Colonial Library nor raided post-colonial theory in 
order to express a fictional or scholarly response. I have been economical in 
my use of African or Western philosophy in order to provide a more or less 
meaningful response to the conference/publication’s call. But even through 
this use, I have also not imagined a dialogue between “you” and me. Like 
Ouattara, I have simply engaged with the question of this 
conference/publication in a way that reveals my ethno-thought. Again, this 
does not mean I engage either the science of ethnology or the discipline of 
philosophy. This simply means that I operated from a post-philosophical 
perspective that neither betrays my background nor makes assumptions 
about the other. This ethno-thought took place because earth, sky, and gods 
were also involved. Together, the fourfold rang.71 Out of this ringing, Africa 
made itself faintly heard in the distance, not as a sum of historical, 
geographical, cultural, or societal accounts that can be validated or verified, 
evaluated or even judged in any of the ontic sciences, but as potential 
subject(s) perverting all these ontical determinations and calculations.  
This ringing hints at the fact that no thinking of a limit to Africa or 
African philosophy is possible. Free from the dictatorship of mono-logical 
referents, the limit ceases to be conceivable even as an invaginated72 
topology where the demarcation between an “over here” and an “over 
there” has been blurred to the point of being utterly unrecognizable. It also 
ceases to be conceivable as a provocation, the urgency of the call of that 
which is to come. Africa or African philosophy can have neither one limit 
nor a multiplicity of limits not because it can never be conceived as an object 
of representation, but because it knows no proper ground or enclosed sky 
and because no mortal is able to enunciate it without these gods that pervert 
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the very consolidation of its happenstance. Thus freed, what we call a 
continent of earth, what we determine as having specific cultural and 
societal values and for good or bad, a few ethnological referents, can no 
longer gather into one. From now on, you or Africa can only disperse into a 
poly-logical fourfold doing for which mortals’ letting-be73 is its absolute 
precondition. Indeed, without letting be of the “I think”/time (and thereby 
of all mono-logical thinking), we will not be able to hear74 how we dwell 
alongside earth, sky and gods. To hear the poly-logic of the fourfold, to hear 
how we dwell, we really need to start learning to be mortal and invent a 
new post-philosophical language.  
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John Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1997). 
50 Heidegger says that the impetus behind these movements comes from the godhead (die Gottheit), 
the realm of divinity. Heidegger, ‘The Thing,’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, 146-7 and 178. For 
a commentary on this, see Martinon, “Time Unshackled.” Briefly, this godhead stands not for 
God as such, but for the future understood in its radicality: i.e. what cannot be anticipated or 
predicted and yet can only manifest itself through gods as future-presents. Understood in this 
way, this radical future or godhead is not a time after the last mortal, but the time of the 
fourfold. In this, I am following Schürmann’s work and in doing so, deliberately evading 
conventional readings of the godhead in Heidegger, for example, John D. Caputo, The Mystical 
Element in Heidegger's Thought (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986). 
51 Martin Heidegger, Mindfulness [Besinnung], trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (London: 
Continuum, 2006), 205.  
52 Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 225. 
53 On this note, see the way Mudimbe remarkably articulates the arrival of God’s speech in Africa 
and the creation of a more indigenous understanding of this speech in Africa in Mudimbe, 
Parables and Fables. See also the equally remarkable analysis of this tralatitious movement in 
Grant Farred, “Life, ‘Life’ and Death,” in Grant Farred, Kasereka Kavwahirehi and Leonhard 
Praeg, Violence in/and the Great Lakes: The Thought of V-Y Mudimbe and Beyond 
(Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2014), 35-53. 
54 On the idea that language is war see Jean-Paul Martinon, After “Rwanda”: In Search of a New 
Ethics (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2013). See also on the theme of the Word of God and its repetition 
and translation: Andrew Benjamin, Translation, and the Nature of Philosophy: A New Theory of 
Words (London: Routledge, 1989), 151. 
55 There is unfortunately no space here to deal with this enormous question: the establishment of an 
ethics no longer riveted to human actions alone, but in play with the other dimensions of the 
fourfold. On this topic, one would need to destabilize and decenter all understanding of ethics 
(starting from Levinas’ radical ethics) and normative morality and free them from the centrality 
of our finitude and the pettiness of human actions. I hint at this, but more with an eye towards 
politics, right at the end of “Time Unshackled.”  
56 As Schürmann rightly says, “The fourfold does not signify anything other than the constellations—
no longer entities, not even of presence and absence—of the event in which the particular 
‘presences.’ …It signifies the ceaseless newness with which “the earth and the sky, the gods and 
the mortals determine ‘the thing,’ each thing.” Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 
219. 
57 This does not mean that there is nothing outside of the thematization and rationalization of the 
fourfold; i.e. nothing that could be utterly unpredictable, dangerous, and even perhaps 
worrisome. The fourfold is also essentially vulnerable, open to danger and death. The whole 
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section devoted to the ‘Last God’ in Heidegger’s Beïtrage testifies to this, a section in which 
Heidegger precisely asks: “Why should thinking about the Godhead be a matter of calculation 
instead of an attempt at meditation on the danger of something strange and incalculable?” 
Although the gods depend on the event of being in order to sustain their divine nature, they do 
not therefore alter the fact that danger or opportunity structures the fourfold and mortals can 
still be called by an elsewhere.” Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 
trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2012), 
322. 
58 There is no space to explore this topic properly here. Suffice to say that one of the most recent 
and forceful attempts to debunk the equation time = cogito comes obviously from the 
Speculative Realists and specifically, Quentin Meillassoux. The problem with Meillassoux’s 
attempt to articulate time outside of all subjectivity (cogito) is that time ends up escaping all 
laws including the law of finitude that governs the subject that I am. As he says, “unreason 
becomes the attribute of [this] absolute time capable of destroying or creating any determinate 
entity without any reason for its creation or destruction.” Quentin Meillassoux, Time Without 
Becoming (Rome: Mimesis International, 2014), 34. Meillassoux’s absolute time then becomes 
equated with unreason or absolute contingency, without realizing that this absolute time can 
only really remain intelligible as Derrida and others have shown as always already absorbed in 
language, in Meillassoux’s very own speech. The end result is that like correlationists before 
them, anti-correlationists effectively remain incapable of dealing with absolute ana-archy 
simply because they fail to see the mono-logical character of the reason (cogito) or mind that 
address it. For a comprehensive account of this movement, see Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and 
Graham Harman, eds., The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism (Victoria: 
re.press, 2011). For a brave attempt to show that Meillassoux doesn’t see the problems with his 
understanding of time, see Martin Hägglund, “Radical Atheist Materialism: A Critique of 
Meillassoux,” in Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman, eds., The Speculative Turn: 
Continental Materialism and Realism (Melbourne: re.press, 2011), 114-129. 
59 As Schürmann rightly says, with the fourfold, human beings “find themselves, as it were, 
marginalized.” Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 211. 
60 Ouattara, “Figures ethnologiques de la pensée de l’être,” 90. 
61 The following examples would need to be analyzed in detail in order to make this point more 
forcefully: Firstly, Derrida’s “democracy to come” is exemplary of a philosophy overemphasizing 
the present without giving us a way out. See Jacques Derrida, “The Last of the Rogue States: 
The ‘Democracy to Come,’ Opening in Two Turns,” trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, 
in The South Atlantic Quarterly 103, No. 2/3 (Spring/Summer 2004): 323-341. Closer to us, the 
Accelerationists (See Robin Mackay and Armen Avanessian, eds., Accelerate: The Accelerationist 
Reader, Falmouth, Urbanomic, 2014) and their critics (for example, Benjamin Noys, Malign 
Velocity: Accelerationism and Capitalism, London, Zero Books, 2014) also give us a ‘frenetic 
standstill’ that offers no escape route out of global capitalism. There is also the work of Daniel 
Innerarity who calls for a future of calculation but no opening beyond this calculation, see 
Daniel Innerarity, The Future and Its Enemies: In Defense of Political Hope, trans. Sandra 
Kingery (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). Finally, there are also the arguments against 
procreative or heteronormative futures in the field of queer theory, but no reflection on what 
lies beyond this eternal present. See, for example, Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and 
the Death Drive (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005). 
62 The multiplication and deepening of futurities or gods would require to think the shift between 
ontological “dwelling” to ontical “inhabiting” and thus between commons to communities with 
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specific gods. I hope to address this political issue in Jean-Paul Martinon and Adnan Madani, 
Visual Culture as World Forming (Berlin: Sternberg, 2017). 
63 In this last section, the second person pronoun will be used interchangeably with Africa. The 
occasional use of quotation marks is not intended to objectify the subject Africa, but as a 
reference to the person being addressed. 
64 If, as Derrida has taught us, language is never mine, with the fourfold it becomes even more 
estranged, stubborn (earth), ethereal (sky), and godly (gods). On the fact that we never own 
language, see Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other or the Prosthesis of Origin, trans. 
Patrick Mensah (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
65 Both in its undecidable sense (finite or infinite) and in the sense of the one within and without 
the other. These senses are here used within the context of mortals, but as will become 
evident, should be applied to the other three elements. For an analysis of this open word with 
regards to mortals alone, see Emmanuel Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, trans. Bettina 
Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), especially, 62-7. 
66 Like Derrida’s arrivant, for example. See Jacques Derrida, Aporias Dying—Awaiting (One Another 
at) the “Limits of Truth,” trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 74. 
67 For the idea that the earth is not a ground, see Martin Heidegger, Off The Beaten Track, trans. 
Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 24-5. 
68 Mudimbe, The Idea of Africa, xv. 
69 On this theme, see Ouattara, Penser l’Afrique. 
70 “The destinerrance of the envois, (sendings, missives, so to speak), is connected with a structure 
in which randomness and incalculability are essential.” Jacques Derrida, “No Apocalypse, Not 
Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives),” trans. Catherine Porter and Philip 
Lewis, in Diacritics 14, no. 2 (Summer, 1984): 29. 
71 This is Heidegger’s word to describe the way the fourfold works together: “The gathered presence 
of the mirror-play of the world, joining in this way, is the ringing. In the ringing of the mirror-
play ring, the four nestle into their unifying presence, in which each one retains its own nature. 
So nestling, they join together, worlding, the world.” Heidegger, “The Thing,” in Poetry, 
Language, Thought, 178. 
72 See Jacques Derrida, “The Law of Genre,” in Glyph 7, (1980): 202-32. 
73 The expression “letting-be” [Gelassenheit] should be understood both as a way of letting 
ourselves be destined by the fourfold and opening ourselves to its mystery. “Letting-be” involves 
therefore no pre-de-termination of the fourfold. On the expression “letting-be” outside of any 
reference to the fourfold, see, for example, Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. 
John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 54-7. For a commentary 
on this notion, see Bret W. Davis, Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007). 
74 “Hear” and not “see.” The move from the ocular to the aural is crucial because it calls for a 
vibration and not for a visual objectification and appropriation (I see = I know). Heidegger talks, 
for example, of having an “ear for the never-ending resonance of the sound of the oldest words 
[i.e. the gods].” Heidegger, Mindfullness, 217. However, it is obviously Levinas who is the most 
acutely aware of the need to shift from seeing to hearing. See Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 
126. For a commentary, see Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 124-5. 
